

Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8396

S E C R E T GABORONE 1296

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY FROM SCHAUFLE

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PFOR, BC, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KHAMA

REF: LUSAKA 1750

1. I MET WITH PRESIDENT KHAMA FOR APPROXIMATELY NINETY MINUTES AFTERNOON JULY 9 AND PRESENTED TALKING POINTS.
2. KHAMA RESPONDED FAVORABLY ON NEARLY EVERY POINT. HE RAISED SOME ISSUES TO WHICH I WAS ABLE TO REPLY.
3. KHAHAMA. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIAN LARGELY COINCIDED WITH OUR OWN. INDIRECTLY BUT CLEARLY REFERRING TO MACHEL, HE SAID THAT IF THIRD FORCE IDEA IS CONTINUED, THE PROSPECT IS FOR PROTRACTED ARMS STRUGGLE WITH OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. HE EVEN SPECULATED THAT IT MIGHT CONTINUE WITH A BLACK-LEAD GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. HE CONFIRMED REPORTS OF FIGHTING AMONG GUERRILLAS. SINCE ZANU HAS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY AMONG FREEDOM FIGHTERS ZAPU IS HOLDING BACK AND BELIEVES MACHEL SUPPORTS ZANU. ON THE OTHER HAND MACHEL SEEMS TO THINK ZAPU IS HOLDING BACK TO JUMP IN TO ASSUME ROLE MPLA DID IN ANGOLA. KHAMA, HOWEVER, QUESTIONED WHETHER NKOMO HAD WIDESPREAD SUPPORT OF ALL ELEMENTS OF RHODESIAN BLACK POPULATION.

4. REFERRING TO SPECIFIC POINTS, HE THOUGHT THAT WITH THE PRIOR

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ASSURANCE OF MAJORITY RULE, THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE RESUMED

AND THAT MUZOREWA FACTION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO FALL IN AND PARTICIPATE TO AVOID BEING LEFT OUT OF FINAL SETTLEMENT.

5. HE QUERIED ME ON GUARANTEES ASKING IF SUCH GUARANTEES WOULD INCLUDED SUCH THINGS AS CONTINUANCE OF DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES PRACTICED BY THE PRESENT RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT AND STIPULATED NUMBER OF WHITE REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT. I TOLD HIM THAT OUR PRESENT THINKING ON GUARANTEES EXTENDED ONLY TO ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND I ANTICIPATED OTHER POINTS HE MENTIONED WOULD BE NEGOTIATED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HE WAS REASSURED BY THIS EXPLANATION.

6 KHAMA DIVIDED RHODESIAN WHITES INTO THREE CATEGORIES --

THOSE WHO WISH TO STAY, THE HARDLINERS WHO WANT TO RESIST TO THE END, AND THOSE WHO WOULD BE PREPARED TO STAY IF THEY HAD REASONABLE ASSURANCES ABOUT THE FUTURE. IN ADDITION, HE NOTED THAT BY AFRICAN STANDARDS, RHODESIAN PRESENTLY HAS AN ADVANCED ECONOMY WHICH NO RESPONSIBLE BLACK LEADER WOULD WISH TO DESTROY. THEREFORE HE THOUGHT THE SYSTEM OF GUARANTEES WAS A GOOD ONE.

7. HE SAID THAT A RETURN TO BRITISH AUTHORITY WAS PRACITCALLY THE ONLY POSSIBILITY IN THE PROCESS OF SOLVING THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE, FOR INSTANCE, WAS NOT POSSIBLE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND IF THERE WERE NO TRANSNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE DISUNITED BLACKS WOULD CREATE CHAOS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY AND BASIC INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. HE NOTED HE HAD NO FEAR OF PROTRACTED BRITISH AUTHORITY SINCE UK WANTED TO GET RID OF RHODESIAN PROBLEM AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.

8 LIKE KAUNDA, HE ADMITTED THAT VORSTER HAS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS IN MAKING CONCESSIONS ON RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIA BUT SAID THEY SHOULDN'T BE OVERESTIMATED. IN THE CASE OF RHODESIA, KAHAMA POINTED OUT THAT BULK OF THE WHITE RHODESIANS IS OF ENGLISH BACKGROUND FOR WHICH THE NATIONALIST AFRIKAANERS HAVE LITTLE SYMPATHY. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT THE BASIC RESISTANCE WITHIN NATIONALIST PARTY, ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT, MIGHT NOT BE WIDESPREAD.

9. WITH REGARD TO NAMIBIA, HE ASKED WHETHER WE THOUGHT SOUTH
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AFRICANS WOULD AGREE TO THE POINTS LISTED IN MY TALKING POINTS. I REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, WE THINK IT IS POSSIBLE,

AND IF IT IS POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD TRY IT. HE AGREED.

10. I THEN SUGGESTED THAT IN MY REPORT TO YOU, I COULD CHARACTERIZE HIS RESPONSE AS BASICALLY FAVORABLE. HE EMPHATICALLY AGREED AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE IMPORTANT THING

NOW IS TO MOVE RAPIDLY. DISUNITY OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS MIGHT IN FACT BE HELPFUL. THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO FACE DIRECTLY THE DETAILED PROBLEM OF PREPARING TO GOVERN. ONLY NKOMOMO, HE NOTED, HAD GRAPPLED WITH THESE QUESTIONS IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SMITH. THERE ARE NO PERFECT SOLUTIONS, AND IF WE WAIT FOR THEM THERE WILL BE NO FAVORABLE OUTCOME.

11. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION, I DESCRIBED KAUNDA'S REACTION AS REPORTED REFTTEL, INCLUDING KAUNDA'S RESERVATIONS ABOUT YOUR GOING TO SOUTH AFRICA VIA BLACK AFRICA WITHOUT PRIOR ASSURANCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN AGREEMENT. I ALSO PROVIDED HIM MY RESPONSE TO THAT RESERVATION, WITH WHICH HE CONCURRED.

12. IN REEMPHASIZING NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO OTHER COUNTRIES, I TOLD KHAMA THAT THIS IS COMPLEMENTARY TO OUR COMMON CONCLUSION THAT WE MUST MOVE RAPIDLY. FOR INFORMATION TO GET OUT WOULD BE JUST AS DAMAGING AS LOSS FOR MOMENTUM.

13. IT WAS NO DOUBT HELPFUL AT END OF CONVERSATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA THAT I WAS ABLE TO ASSURE KHAMA THAT WE WERE MOVING VIGOROUSLY TO FIND ASSISTANCE FUNDS TO PAVING OF BOT-ZAM ROAD, WHICH IS BOTSWANA'S PRIORITY PROJECT.

14. COMMENT: KHAMA IS NOT LEADING ACTOR AMONG THE FOUR PRESIDENTS. BUT HIS VIEWS HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND HE PROVIDES A COUNTERWEIGHT TO MACHEL AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM. IN ADDITION, HIS INSIGHTS INTO RHODESIAN INTERNAL SITUATION ARE LESS AUTHORITATIVE THAN KAUNDA'S. AT THIS POINT I THINK WE CAN STATE THAT WE HAVE EABRT. WHETHER OR NOT THERE MIGHT BE A CHANGE IN HIS POSITION AS A RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER THREE PRESIDENTS IS DIFFICULT TO
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ASSESS IN ADVANCE. IT NOW APPEARS THAT ALL FOUR PRESENTS WILL BE ATTENDING THE OPENING OF THE TAN-ZAM RAILROAD JULY 14 IN ZAMBIA, WHICH FROM STANDPOINT MY MISSION, MAY ASSUME AN UNANTICIPATED IMPORTANCE.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, POLITICAL SITUATION, MEETING REPORTS, CAT-C, CHEROKEE 07/09/76
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976GABORO01296
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: DG PER 76 GABORONE 1324
Executive Order: R9
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840084-0552
From: GABORONE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760776/aaaacnzv.tel
Line Count: 159
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 76 LUSAKA 1750, 76 GABORONE 1750
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 JUL 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 JUL 2004 by MartinML>; APPROVED <18 OCT 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KHAMA
TAGS: PFOR, PREL, BC, US, (KHAMA, SERETSE M)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006